

CSE

Intro To The Byzantine Generals Problem

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Pease

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Byzantine Generals Problem

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BGP – the Generals

- Loyal Generals
 - Behave according to the algorithm
 - They decide upon the same plan
 - Every loyal general must obtain the same $v(1) \dots v(n)$
 - A small number of traitors shouldn't be able to force a bad decision
 - If the i^{th} general is loyal $v(i)$ must be used by all (loyal) generals
- Traitorous Generals
 - Try to influence the final decision
 - Send any info they want

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Byzantine Generals Problem (formalism)

- $0 \dots N-1$ processes in a complete graph
- Process 0 needs to send a value v to all others such that
 - (IC1) If process 0 is non faulty then any non faulty process i receives v
 - (IC2) If processes i and j are non faulty, they receive the same value
- Note: 0 is non faulty, then $IC1 \Rightarrow IC2$

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Impossibility Results – Oral Msg

- Oral message – the content is entirely under the control of the sender
- No solution if more than $1/3$ of the generals are traitorous

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
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Traitorous Lieutenant

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- ## Impossibility Results – Generalization
- No solution with fewer than $3m+1$ generals for m traitors
 - Proof by contradiction: reduce the problem to the 3 generals problem
 - Assume $3m$ (let's call them Albanians) or fewer generals can cope with m traitors
 - Build the solution with Byzantine generals
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