

UNSW

Security
An Advanced Introduction

COMP9242
2009/S2 Week 7

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What is Security?

- Example 1: DOS
 - Single-user system with no access control
 - Is it secure?
 - ... if it has no data?
 - ... if it contains the payroll database?
 - ... if it is on a machine in the foyer
 - ... if it is in a locked room?
 - ... if it is behind a firewall?

What is Security?

- Example 2: Banking store's weekly earnings:
 - ~ Is it secure to
 - ... ask a random customer to do it?
 - ... ask many random customers to do it?
 - ... ask a staff member to do it?
 - ... ask several staff members to do it?
 - ... hire a security firm?
 - ... hire several security firms?

 - ~ Depends? On what?

Overview

- *Operating systems security overview*
- Types of secure systems
- Security policies
- Security mechanisms
- Trusted Computing
- Design principles
- OS security verification
- OS design for security

Secure Operating System

- Provides for secure execution of applications
- Must provide security policies that support the users' security requirements
- Must enforce those security policies
- Must be safe from tampering etc.

- Security policy:
 - specifies *allowed* and *disallowed states* of a system
 - OS needs to ensure that no disallowed state is ever entered
 - OS *mechanisms* prevent transitions from allowed to disallowed states
- Security policy needs to identify the *assets* to be secure
 - For computer security, assets are typically *data*
- Perfect security is generally unachievable
 - need to be aware of *threats*
 - need to understand what *risks* can be tolerated

Data Security

Three aspects:

- **Confidentiality:** prevent *theft* of data
 - concealing data from unauthorised agents
 - *need-to-know principle*
- **Integrity:** prevent *damage* to data
 - trustworthiness of data: data *correctness*
 - trustworthiness of origin of data: *authentication*
- **Availability:** prevent *denial* of service
 - ensuring data is usable when needed

Threats

- A *weakness* is a potential for a security violation
- An *attack* is an attempt by an *attacker* to violate security
 - ~ generally implies exploiting a weakness
- A *threat* is a potential for an attack
- There is never a shortage of attackers, hence in practice:
 - ~ threat \Rightarrow attack
 - ~ weakness \Rightarrow violation

Threats

- Snooping
 - disclosure of data
 - attack on *confidentiality*
- Modification/alteration
 - unauthorised change of data
 - attack on *data integrity*
- Masquerading/spoofing
 - one entity impersonating another
 - attack on *authentication integrity*
 - delegation?
- Repudiation of origin
 - false denial of being source
 - attack on *integrity*
- Denial of receipt
 - false denial of receiving
 - attack on *availability* and *integrity*
- Delay
 - temporarily inhibiting service
 - attack on *availability*
- Denial of service
 - permanently inhibiting service
 - attack on *availability*

Security Policy

- Partitions system into allowed and disallowed states
- Ideally mathematical model
- In practice, natural-language description
 - ~ often imprecise, ambiguous, inconsistent, unenforceable
 - ~ Example: transactions over \$10k require manager approval
 - but transferring \$10k into own account is no violation

Security Mechanisms

- Used to enforce security policy
 - computer access control (login authentication)
 - operating system file access control system
 - controls implemented in tools
- Example:
 - Policy: only accountant can access financial system
 - Mechanism: on un-networked computer in locked room with only one key
- A *secure system* provides mechanisms that ensure that violations are
 - prevented
 - detected
 - recovered from

Assumptions

- Security is always based on assumptions
 - ~ eg. lock is secure, key holders are trustworthy
- Invalid assumptions *void* security!
- Problem: assumptions are often implicit and poorly understood
- Security assumptions must be:
 - ~ clearly identified
 - ~ evaluated for validity

Potentially Invalid Assumptions

- The security policy is unambiguous and consistent
- The mechanisms used to implement the policy are correctly designed
- The union of mechanisms implements the policy correctly
- The mechanisms are correctly implemented
- The mechanisms are correctly installed and administered

- Systems always have *trusted entities*
 - hardware, operating system, sysadmin
- Totally of trusted entities is the *trusted computing base* (TCB)
 - the part of the system that can circumvent security
- A *trusted system* can be used to process security-critical assets
 - gone through some process (“*assurance*”) to establish its trustworthiness
 - should really be called *trustworthy system*
- *Trusted computing*:
 - provides mechanisms and procedures for trusted systems
 - in practice usually refers to TCG mechanisms for secure boot, encryption etc

- TCB: *The totality of protection mechanisms within a computer system — including hardware, firmware and software — the combination of which is responsible for enforcing a security policy*

[RFC 2828]

A TCB consists of one or more components that together enforce a unified security policy over a product or system

The ability of the TCB to correctly enforce a security policy depends solely on the mechanisms within the TCB and on the correct inputs by system administrative personnel or parameters related to the security policy

Trusted Computing

- TCB is by definition *trusted*. That doesn't make it *trustworthy*!
- Aim of *trusted computing* (TC): establish and maintain trustworthiness
 - ~ ... with respect to certain security requirements
 - ~ should really be called *trustworthy computing*!
- TC ensures that system is operating in defined configuration
 - ~ based on the assumption that certain components can be trusted
- Challenge: maintain system security during configuration changes
- Idea based on notion of *secure booting* [Arbaugh et al. 97]:
 - ~ *root of trust* provided by hardware
 - ~ software components are *certified* as trusted
 - ~ TCB securely expanded by loading trusted components only
 - ~ hardware- and software mechanisms to prevent tampering
- Establish *chain of trust* from root of trust

Covert Channels (Side Channels)

- Information flow that is not controlled by a security mechanism
 - Security requires *absence of covert channels*
- Two types of covert channels
 - Covert *storage* channel uses an attribute of a shared resource
 - shared resource states (eg. meta data, object accessibility)
 - global names can create covert storage channels
 - in principle subject to access control
 - a sound access-control system should be *free* of covert channels
 - Covert *timing* channel uses temporal order of accesses to shared resource
 - outside access-control system
 - difficult to reason about
 - difficult to prevent

Covert Timing Channels

- Created via shared resource whose behaviour can be monitored
 - network bandwidth
 - CPU load
 - response time
 - locks
- Requires access to a time source
 - real-time clock
 - anything else that allows unrelated processes to synchronise
 - preventable by perfect virtualisation?
- Critical issue is bandwidth
 - in practice, the damage is limited if the bandwidth is low
 - e.g DRM doesn't care about low-bandwidth channels
 - beware of amplification
 - e.g leaking of passwords

Establishing Trustworthiness

- Process to show *TCB is trustworthy*
- Two approaches
 - *assurance* (systematic evaluation and testing)
 - *formal verification* (mathematical proof)
- *Certification* confirms process was successfully concluded

- Process for *bolstering* (substantiating or specifying) trustworthiness
 - Specifications
 - unambiguous description of system behaviour
 - Can be formal (mathematical model) or informal
 - Design
 - justification that it meets specification
 - mathematical translation of specification or compelling argument
 - Implementation
 - justification that it is consistent with the design
 - mathematical proof or code inspection and rigorous testing
 - by implication must also satisfy specification
 - Operation and maintenance
 - justification that system is used as per assumption in specification
- Assurance does not *guarantee* correctness or security!

US Department of Defence “Orange Book” [DoD 86]:

- Officially the *Trusted Computing Systems Evaluation Criteria* (TCSEC)
- Defines security classes
 - D: minimal protection
 - C1-2: discretionary access control (DAC)
 - B1-B3: mandatory access control (MAC)
 - A1: verified design
- Designed for military use
- Systems can be certified to a certain class
 - very costly, hence only available for big companies
 - most systems only certified C2 (essentially Unix-style security)
- Superseded by *Common Criteria*
 - orange book no longer has any official standing
 - however, still an excellent reference for security terminology and rationale

Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation [ISO/IEC 15408, 99]:

- ISO standard, developed out of Orange Book and other approaches
 - US, Canada, UK, Germany, France, Netherlands
 - for general use (not just military, not just operating systems)
- Unlike Orange Book, doesn't prescribe specific security requirements
 - evaluates quality assurance used to ensure requirements are met
- *Target of evaluation* (TOE) evaluated against *security target* (ST)
 - ST is statement of desired security properties
 - based on *protection profiles* (PPs) — generic sets of requirements
 - defined by “users” (typically governments)
- Seven *evaluation assurance levels* (EALs)
 - higher levels imply more thorough evaluation (and higher cost)
 - *not* necessarily better security
- Details later

- Process of mathematical proof of security properties
- Based on a mathematical *model* of the system
- Two Parts:
 - Proof that *model satisfies security requirements*
 - generally difficult, except for very simple models
 - Proof that *code implements model*
 - proving theorems showing correspondence
 - even harder, feasible only for few 1000 LOC
 - hardly ever done (few tiny special-purpose OS kernels only to date)
- Note: *model checking* (static analysis) is not sufficient
 - shows presence or absence of certain properties of code
 - uninitialised variables, array-bounds, null-pointer de-ref
 - may be sound (guaranteed to detect all violations) or unsound
 - Model checking does not prove implementation correctness!

- Computer security is complex
 - depends on many aspects of computer system
- Policy defines security, mechanisms enforce security
- Important to consider:
 - what are the assumptions about threats and trustworthiness?
 - incorrect assumptions \Rightarrow no security
- Security is never absolute
 - given enough resources, mechanisms can be defeated
 - important to understand limitations
 - inherent tradeoffs between security and usability
- Human factors are important
 - people make mistakes
 - people may not understand security impact of actions
 - people may be less trustworthy than thought

Overview


- Operating systems security overview
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Secure Systems Classification

- Based on Orange Book terminology
 - assumes military-style security problem
 - data of different security classifications
 - system must ensure that classification is enforced
 - focussed on confidentiality
- Classifies systems based on the kind of data they can deal with
 - *single-level secure* (SLS) system
 - *multiple single-level secure* (MSL) system
 - *multi-level secure* (MLS) system
- Basis of *multiple-independent levels of security* (MILS) architecture



Single-Level Secure (SLS) System

- Suitable only for processing data of one particular security level
 - generally the lowest, i.e. unclassified




Multiple Single-Level (MSL) Secure System

- System suitable for processing data of several security levels
 - only one security level at a time, up to some limit
- Multiple instances used, each one as a SLS system





Multi-Level Secure (MLS) System

- Suitable for processing data of several security levels
 - concurrently, up to some limit
 - needs to ensure that classifications are honoured
 - does this by labelling all data
- Requires *mandatory access control* in OS




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unclassified.


MLS + MSL System

- MLS component handles multiple levels of data
- Only a single level of data goes to each of the MSL secure systems



MLS System Using Virtualization

- MLS hypervisor runs several MSL secure OSes in individual virtual machines
- Result is MLS system
- An example of a *multiple independent levels of security* (MILS) architecture
 - Hypervisor here operates as a *separation kernel*
 - Separates (isolates) different *security domains*



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Security Policies: Categories


- *Discretionary* (user-controlled) policies (DAC)
 - e.g A can read B's objects only with A's permission
 - user decides about access (at their discretion)
 - classical example: Unix permissions
- *Mandatory* (system-controlled) policies (MAC)
 - e.g certain users cannot ever access certain objects
 - no user can change these
 - focus on restricting *information flow*
 - inherent requirement for MLS systems, MILS
- *Role-based* policies (RBAC)
 - agents can take on specific pre-defined roles
 - well-defined set of roles for each agent
 - e.g normal user, sysadmin, database admin
 - access rights depend on role

Models for Security Policies

- Represent a whole class of security policies
- Most system-wide policies focus on *confidentiality*
 - e.g military-style multi-level security models
 - Classical example is *Bell-LaPadula* model [Bell & LaPadula 76]
 - example of a *labelled security model*
 - most others developed from this
 - Orange Book based on this model
 - *Chinese-wall* policy focuses on conflict of interest
- Some newer models focus on *integrity*
 - *Bibra* model derived from Bell-LaPadula
 - *Clark-Wilson* model based on separation of duty
 - maps to role-based access control

Bell-LaPadula Model

- Each object a has a security *classification* $L(a)$
- Each agent o has a security *clearance* $L(o)$
- Classifications
 - e.g top secret > secret > confidential > unclassified
- Rule 1 (*no read up*):
 - a can *read* o only if $L(a) \geq L(o)$
 - standard confidentiality
- Rule 2 (*★ Property — no write down*)
 - a can *write* o only if $L(a) \leq L(o)$
 - prevents *leakage* (accidental or by conspiracy)




Bell-LaPadula Model

- Mother of all military-style security models
- Inherently requires implementation as MAC
 - all subjects must be bound to policy
- If implemented inside a single system, requires MLS system
- Major limitation: cannot deal with *declassification*
 - needed to pass any information from high- to low-security domain
 - logging
 - command chain
 - documents where sensitive portions have been censored
 - encrypted data
- Typically dealt with by special *privileged functions*
 - outside security policy
 - outside systematic reasoning
 - part of TCB
 - likely source of security holes

Chinese Wall Policy

- Employed by investment banks to manage conflict of interest
- Idea: Consultant cannot talk to clients' competitors
 - ~ single consultant can have multiple concurrent clients
- Define *conflict classes* (groups of potentially competing clients)
 - ~ eg banks, oil companies, insurance companies, OS vendors
- Consultant dealing with client of class A cannot talk to others in A
 - ~ but can continue talking to members of other classes
 - ~ some data belongs to several conflict classes
- Public information is not restricted
 - ~ consultant can read and write public info at any time
 - ~ but must observe ~~no~~ property (cannot publish confidential info)
- Example of a *dynamic MAC policy*
 - ~ allowed information flow changes over time


Chinese Wall Policy



- In practice need a way to remove conflicts
- transaction completed...

Bibra Model

- Dual to Bell-LaPadula for integrity
- Each subject a , object o has a integrity level L
- Rule 1 (*no read down*):
 - a can *read* o only if $L(a) \leq L(o)$
- Rule 2 (*★ Property — no write up*)
 - a can *write* o only if $L(a) \geq L(o)$
- Obviously incompatible with Bell-LaPadula
 - ... if higher security requires higher integrity
 - must choose between confidentiality and integrity
- Bibra doesn't model any practical system



Clark-Wilson Model

- Security *framework* for ensuring integrity based on separation of duties
 - doesn't provide specific state transformations, only constraints on them
 - helps in formalising security policies
- Distinguishes *constrained* (integrity-guaranteed) and *unconstrained* data
 - Operations on unconstrained data must be defined for all values and produce constrained data
- Specifies requirements on the system and its operations
 - protect integrity-critical data, authentication, integrity of transformations, logging
 - operations certified to operate on certain data
- Doesn't actually specify what “separation of duties” means
 - “Allowed relations must meet the requirements of 'separation of duties'”

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- Used to implement security policies
- Based on access control
 - Discretionary access control (DAC)
 - Mandatory access control (MAC)
 - Role-based access control (RBAC)
- Access rights
 - *Simple rights*
 - Read, write, execute/invoke, send, receive
 - *Meta rights* (DAC only)
 - Copy
 - Propagate own rights to another agent
 - Own
 - Change rights of an object or agent

Access Control Matrix

	Objects			
Agents	S ₁	S ₂	O ₃	O ₄
S ₁	terminate	wait, signal, send	read	
S ₂	wait, signal, terminate			read, execute, write
S ₃		wait, signal, receive		
S ₄	control		execute	write

Defines each agent's rights on any object

Note: agents are objects too

Properties of the Access Control Matrix

- Rows define agents' *protection domains* (PDs)
- *Columns* define objects' *accessibility*
- Dynamic data structure:
 - Frequent permanent changes (e.g. object creation, chmod)
 - Frequent temporary changes (e.g. setuid)
- Very *sparse* with many repeated entries
- Impractical to store explicitly

Protection-Matrix Implementation: ACLs

Represent column-wise: **access control list (ACL)**:

- *ACL* associated with *object*
- Usually condensed via *domain classes* (UNIX, NT groups)
- Full ACLs used by Multics, Apollo Domain, Andrew FS, NTFS
- Can have *negative rights* to:
 - reduce window of vulnerability
 - simplify exclusion from groups
- Sometimes implicit (Unix process hierarchy)
- Implemented in almost all commercial systems

Represent row-wise: **capabilities** [Dennis & Van Horn 66]:

- *Capability list* associated with agent
 - each capability confers a certain right to its holder
- Can have *negative rights* to:
 - reduce window of vulnerability
 - simplify management of groups of capabilities
- Caps have been popular in research for a long time
- Few successful commercial systems until recently:
 - main one is IBM System/38 / AS400 / i-Series
 - increasingly appearing in commercial systems (usually add-on)


- Main advantage of capabilities is the *fine-grained access control*:
 - easy to provide specific agents access to individual objects
- Capability presets *prima facie* evidence of the *right to access*
 - capability ⇒ *object identifier* (implies naming)
 - capability ⇒ (set of) *access rights*
 - any representation must contain object ID and access rights
 - any representation must protect capability from forgery
- How are caps implemented and protected?
 - *tagged* — protected by hardware
 - popular in the past, rarely today (exception: IBM i-Series)
 - *sparse* (or *user-mode*) — protected by sparsity
 - probabilistically secure, like encryption
 - propagation outside system control — hard to enforce security policies
 - *partitioned/segregated* — protected by software (kernel)
 - main version of caps used in modern systems

Tagged Capabilities

- *Tag bit(s)* with every (group of) memory word(s)
 - ~ tag identifies capabilities
 - ~ capabilities are used and copied like “normal” pointers
 - ~ hardware checks permissions when dereferencing capability
 - ~ modifications turn tags off (convert to plain data)
 - ~ only privileged instructions(kernel) can turn tags on
 - ~ Issues:
 - ➔ capability hardware tends to be slow (too complex)
 - ➔ hard (if not impossible) to control propagation of authority
 - ➔ revocation virtually impossible (requires memory scan)
 - ➔ amplification possible (below)
- IBM System/38, AS/400, i-Series, many historical systems

Sparse Capabilities

- Basic idea similar to encryption
 - add bit string to make valid capabilities a very small subset of cap space
 - either encrypted object info or password
 - secure by infeasibility of exhaustive search of cap space




Sparse Capabilities

- Sparse caps are user-level objects
 - ~ can be passed like other data
 - similar to tagged caps, but without hardware support
 - validated at mapping time (explicit or implicit)
 - ~ good match to user-level servers
 - no central authority, no kernel required on most ops
 - cannot reference-count objects
- Issues:
 - ~ Full mediation requires extra work
 - but doable, see Mungi [Heiser et al. 98]
 - essentially provided user-level cap segregation
 - ~ High amplification of leaked data
 - problem with convert channels

Segregated (Partitioned) Capabilities

- System maintains *capability list* (Clist) with each agent (process)
 - User code uses indirect references to caps (clist index)
 - c.f Unix file descriptors
 - System validates permissions on access
 - syscall or page-fault time
- Many research systems
 - Hydra, Mach, EROS, and many others
- Increasingly commercial systems
 - KeyKOS (92), OKL4 (08), seL4 (09)
 - add-on to Linux, Solaris



- Problem 1: Executing untrusted code
 - you downloaded a game from the internet
 - how can you be sure it doesn't steal/corrupt your data?
- Problem 2: Digital rights management (DRM)
 - you own copyrighted material (e.g. entertainment media content)
 - you want to let others use it (for a fee)
 - how can you prevent them from making unauthorised copies?
- You need to *confine* the program (game, viewer) so it cannot leak
- Cannot be done with most protection schemes!
 - not with Unix or most other ACL-based schemes
 - not with most tagged or sparse capability schemes
 - multi-level security has some inherent confinement (but can't do DRM)
- Some protection models can confine in principle
 - e.g segregated caps system, can instruct system not to accept any
 - EROS has formal proof of confinement for system model [Shapiro & Weber 00]
 - similar for seL4 (machine-checked proof)

- In practice difficult to achieve due to *covert channels*

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Trusted Computing: The TCG Approach

- Trusted Computing Group (TCG)
 - ~ industry consortium with many members
 - ~ defines industry standards to enable trusted computing
 - ~ term “trusted computing” now virtually synonymous with TCG model
 - ~ ... although it only solves part of the problem
- Defines Trusted Computing Module (TCM)
 - ~ hardware root of trust, aimed at PC/server platforms
 - ~ minimal functionality to support TC
 - ~ implemented either as separate chip or onboard processor chip
- Similarly Mobile Trusted Module (MTM) for mobile devices
 - ~ puts more functionality into software
 - ~ remaining hardware suitable for on-chip integration
- Also TCG Software Stack (TSS) for higher-level functionality

TPM-Enabled Functionality


- Authenticated booting
 - ~ bring up system in well-defined configuration
 - ~ executing only certified binaries
- Remote attestation
 - ~ allow remote party to confirm system configuration
- Sealed storage
 - ~ ensure that data can only be read if system is in particular configuration

Enabled by a set of TPM-provided mechanisms:

- ~ Random-number generation
- ~ Key generation
- ~ key storage
- ~ public-key encryption
- ~ configuration storage
- ~ certificate storage

TPM Components


- Hardware implementations of security-relevant low-level functions
 - ~ random numbers, SHA-1 hash, public-key generation, RSA encryption
 - ~ slow — meant for use before enough trusted software is booted
- Endorsement key (EK)
 - ~ hard-wired private key, uniquely identifies physical device
 - ~ public EK certified and supplied by manufacturer
- Non-volatile storage
 - ~ small amount for EK, some symmetric keys, opt-in flags
 - ~ storage root key (SRK), protected by SRK pass phrase
 - to encrypt keys stored outside TPM



Integrity Measurement

- Idea: “*measure*” all components and securely store measurements
- Measurement: SHA-1 hash of component
 - ~ computed at component-load time, before execution
 - ~ normally computed by software (outside TPM) as TPM SHA-1 is slow
- Secure storage of measurements:
 - ~ store log of measurements outside TPM
 - ~ inside TPM's PCR store condensed (“extended”) measurement:

$$\text{PCR} \leftarrow \text{SHA-1}(\text{PCR} \parallel \text{SHA-1}(\text{component}))$$



- Suffices to verify configuration:
 - ~ compute condensed measurement from log and compare to PCR
 - ~ does not guarantee that software hasn't been modified after loading!
- SHA-1 engine + boot block (CRTM) is *root of trust for measurement* (RTM)

Remote Attestation (aka Integrity Reporting)

- Idea: Provide certified representation of machine state to challenger
 - ~ e.g. service provider who insists on particular configuration
- Two parts reported
 - ~ measurement log kept by software
 - ~ PCR value (accumulated measurements) signed by endorsement key
 - alternatively can set up specific attestation identity key (AIK)
- Challenger can verify
 - ~ recompute PCR value
 - ~ verify signature using
 - knowledge of endorsement key, or
 - previously exchanged AIK
- Endorsement key is *root of trust for reporting* (RTR)

Secure Storage Channel: Sealing

- Idea: Make certain data accessible only to correct machine state
 - ~ pass data securely from “sender” to “receiver” configuration
 - ~ time-travel IPC 😊
- Uses secure encryption
 - ~ generate secret key (random number)
 - ~ use this to encrypt data with trusted (authenticated) program
 - ~ encrypt secret key using SRK, can then be stored anywhere
- Sealing:
 - ~ RSA engine can optionally include PCR configuration in encryption
 - ~ when encrypting key, include
 - present (“sender”) PCR state
 - desired (“receiver”) PCR state
 - ~ only decrypt key if present PCR state matches “receiver” state
 - ~ return “sender” PCR state with decrypted key for confirmation
- Storage root key is *root of trust for storage* (RTS)

Authenticated Boot

- TPM ROM contains:
 - ~ boot block
 - ~ public key of OS manufacturer
- OS components signed by manufacturers key(s)
 - ~ only load components after verifying signatures
 - ~ *measure* components prior to executing
- Boot block loads first OS component
 - ~ using TPM cryptography hardware to authenticate
- First OS components contains
 - ~ SW implementation of crypto
 - ~ potential further software vendor keys


Secure Boot

- Seal (rather than just sign) OS components
 - ~ makes it impossible to boot other than predetermined OS version
- Rather painful
 - ~ complete OS must be sealed separately for individual target machine
 - ~ any software upgrade requires re-sealing
- Quite impractical for normal OS
 - ~ but could be feasible for hypervisor or microkernel
- Based on secure bootstrap work [Arbaugh et al. 97]

Trusted Computing vs Secure OS

- TPM-based trusted-computing approach is based on
 - Hardware root of trust
 - Mechanisms to provide a chain of trust
 - *Not designed to protect against hardware attacks!*
 - including simple stuff such as bus snooping
- Objective is to guarantee that system boots into a well-defined configuration
 - Guarantees that a particular OS binary is running
 - What does this mean about security/trustworthiness?

Trusted Computing vs Secure OS



- TPM-based trusted-computing approach is of limited use
 - As long as the OS isn't trustworthy

Overview

- Operating systems security overview
- Types of secure systems
- Security policies
- Security mechanisms
- Trusted Computing
- *Design principles*
- OS security verification
- OS design for security

Design Principles for Secure OS

- Least privilege (POLA)
- Economy of mechanisms
- Fail-safe defaults
- Complete mediation
- Open design
- Separation of privilege
- Least common mechanisms
- Psychological acceptability

[Saltzer & Schroeder 1975]

Least Privilege

- Also called the *principle of least authority* (POLA)
- Military “need to know” is an example
- Agent should only be given the minimal rights needed for task
 - minimal protection domain
 - PD determined by *function*, not *identity*
 - Unix *root* is evil
 - aim of role-based access control (RBAC)
 - rights added as needed, removed when no longer needed
 - violated by all mainstream OSes
- Example: executing web applet
 - should not have all of user's privileges, only minimal access
 - hard to do with ACL-based systems
 - main motivation for using caps

Least Privilege: Implications for OS

- OS kernel executes in privileged mode of hardware
 - kernel has unlimited privilege!
- POLA implies keeping kernel code to an absolute minimum
 - this means a secure OS must be based on a microkernel!
- Trusted computing base can bypass security
- POLA requires that TCB is minimal
 - microkernel plus minimal security manager

- KISS principle of engineering
 - “keep it simple, stupid!”
- Less code/features/stuff ⇒ less to get wrong
 - makes it easier to fix if something does go wrong
 - complexity is the natural enemy of security
- Also applies to interfaces, interactions, protocols, ...
- Specifically applies to TCB
- Reflected in CC EAL7 “design minimality” requirement
 - justified by need for manual inspection
 - trumped by formal methods

Fail-Safe Defaults

- Default action is no-access
 - if action fails, system remains secure
 - if security administrator forgets to add rule, system remains secure
 - eg, default firewall setting of OS should be “secure”, not “open”!
 - “better safe than sorry”

- *Reference monitor* checks every access
 - violated in Unix file access:
 - access rights checked at open(), then cached
 - access remains enabled until close(), even if attributes change
 - also implies that any rights propagation must be controlled
 - not done with tagged or sparse capability systems
- In practice conflicts with performance!
 - caching of buffers, file descriptors etc
 - without caching unacceptable performance
- Should at least limit window of opportunity
 - e.g guarantee caches are flushed after some fixed period
 - guarantee no cached access after revoking access

- Security must not depend on secrecy of design or implementation
 - TCB must be open to scrutiny
 - *Security by obscurity is poor security*
 - Not all security/certification agencies seem to understand this
- Note that this doesn't rule out passwords or secret keys
 - ... but their creation requires careful *cryptanalysis*

Separation of Privilege

- Require a combination of conditions for granting access
 - e.g user is in group wheel *and* knows the root password
 - Take-grant model for capability-based protection:
 - sender needs *grant* right on capability
 - receiver needs *take* right to accept capability
 - In reality, the security benefit of a separate *take* right is minimal
 - practical cap implementations only provide *grant* as a privilege

Least Common Mechanisms

- Avoid sharing mechanisms
 - shared mechanism \Rightarrow shared channel
 - potential covert channel
- Also, shared mechanisms lead to complex interdependencies
 - makes it harder to analyse system for correctness
 - more likely to hide security problems
 - many classical security breaches result from unforeseen interactions
- Inherent conflict with other design imperatives
 - simplicity \Rightarrow shared mechanisms
 - classical tradeoff...

- Security mechanisms should provide a simple mental model
 - users need to understand the consequences of their actions
- Mechanisms should not add to difficulty of use
 - hide complexity introduced by security mechanisms
 - ensure ease of installation, configurations, use
 - systems are used by humans!
- Inherently problematic:
 - security inherently inhibits ease of use
 - idea is to minimise impact
- Security-usability tradeoff is to a degree unavoidable

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Common-Criteria Protection Profiles for OS

- Controlled Access Protection Profile (CAPP)
 - standard OS security, derived from Orange Book C2
 - certified up to level EAL3
- Single-level Operating System Protection Profile
 - superset of CAPP
 - certified up to EAL4+
- Labeled Security Protection Profile (LSPP)
 - mandatory access control for COTS OSES
 - similar to Orange Book B1
- Role-based Access Control Protection Profile
- Multi-level Operating System Protection Profile
 - superset of CAPP, LSPP
 - certified up to EAL4+
- Separation Kernel Protection Profile (SKPP)
 - strict partitioning
 - certifications aiming for EAL6–7

Common Criteria Assurance Levels

- EAL1: functionally tested
 - simple to do, can be done without help from developer
- EAL2: structurally tested
 - functional and interface spec
 - black- and white-box testing
 - vulnerability analysis
- EAL3: methodically tested and checked
 - improved test coverage
 - procedures to avoid tampering during development
 - highest assurance level achieved for Mac OS X

Common Criteria Assurance Levels

- EAL4: methodically designed, tested and reviewed
 - design docs used for testing, avoid tampering during delivery
 - independent vulnerability analysis
 - highest level feasible on existing product (not developed for CC certific.)
 - achieved by a number of main-stream OSes
 - Windows 2000: EAL4 in 2003
 - SuSe Enterprise Linux: EAL4 in 2005
 - Solaris-10: EAL4+ in 2006
 - controlled access protection profile (CAPP) — *Note: EAL3 profile!*
 - role-based access control PP — *example of non-NSA PP?*
 - RedHat Linux EAL4+ in 2007
 - They still get broken!
 - certification is based on assumptions about environment, etc...
 - most use is outside those assumptions
 - certification means nothing in such a case
 - presumably there were no compromises were assumptions held

Common Criteria Assurance Levels

- EAL5: semi-formally designed and tested
 - formal model of TEO security policy
 - semi-formal model of functional spec & high-level design
 - semi-formal arguments about correspondence
 - covert-channel analysis
 - IBM z-Series hypervisor EAL5 in 2003 (partitioning)
 - attempted by Mandrake for Linux with French Government support
- EAL6: semiformally verified design and tested
 - semiformal low-level design
 - structured representation of implementation
 - modular and layered TOE design
 - systematic covert-channel identification
 - Green Hills Integrity microkernel presently undergoing EAL6+ certification
 - separation kernel protection profile

Common Criteria Assurance Levels

- EAL7: formally verified design and tested
 - formal functional spec and high-level design
 - formal and semiformal demonstration of correspondence
 - between specification and low-level design
 - simple TOE
 - complete independent confirmation of developer tests
 - LynuxWorks claims LynxSecure separation kernel EAL7 “certifiable”
 - ... but not *certified*
 - Green Hills also aiming for EAL7

Note:

- *Even EAL7 relies on testing!*
- EAL7 requires proof of correspondence between formal descriptions
- However, no requirement of formalising LLD, implementation
- Hence no requirement for formal proof of implementation correctness

Common Criteria Limitations

- Little (if any) use in commercial space outside national security
 - This was one of the intentions — by all indications, CC failed here
- Very expensive
 - industry rule-of-thumb: EAL6+ costs \$10k per LOC
 - dominated by documentation requirements
 - no “credit” for doing things better
 - eg formal methods instead of excessive documentation
- Lower EALs of limited practical use
 - Windows is EAL4+ certified!
 - marketing seems to be main driver behind EAL3–4 certification
- Over-evaluation abuses system
 - eg. CAPP (EAL3 profile) certification to EAL4
 - in reality a pointless exercise

- Based on mathematical model of the system
- Complete verification requires two parts:
 - proof that model satisfies requirements of security policies
 - typically prove generic properties that actual policies map to
 - required by CC EAL5–7
 - proof that implementation has same properties as model
 - proof of correspondence between model and implementation
 - not required by CC even at EAL7
 - done by some kernels with very limited functionality
 - never done for any general-purpose OS!
- Model-checking (static analysis) is *incomplete* formal verification
 - shows presence or absence of certain properties
 - e.g uninitialised variables, array-bounds overflows
 - nevertheless useful for assurance

Common Criteria and seL4

Evaluation Level	Requirements	Functional Specification	Top-Down Design	Implementation
EAL1	not eval.	Informal	not eval	not eval
EAL2	not eval.	Informal	Informal	not eval
EAL3	not eval.	Informal	Informal	not eval
EAL4	not eval.	Informal	Informal	Informal
EAL5	not eval.	Semi-Formal	Semi-Formal	Informal
EAL6	Formal	Semi-Formal	Semi-Formal	Informal
EAL7	Formal	Formal	Formal	Informal

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→ Minimize kernel code

- kernel = code that executes in privileged mode
- kernel can bypass any security
- kernel is inherently part of TCB
- kernel can only be verified as a whole (not in components)
 - it's hard enough to verify a minimal kernel

→ How?

- generic mechanisms (economy of mechanisms)
- no policies, only mechanisms
- mechanisms as simple as possible
- only code that must be privileged in order to support secure systems
- free of covert channels:
 - no global names, absolute time

→ Formally specify API

- Minimize mandatory TCB
 - unless formally verified, TCB must be assumed imperfect
 - the smaller, the fewer defects
 - POLA requires, economy of mechanisms leads to minimal TCB
- Ensure TCB is well defined and understood
 - make security policy explicit
 - make granting of authority explicit
- Flexibility to support various uses
 - make authority delegatable
 - ensure mechanisms allow high-performance implementation
- Design for verifiability
 - minimize implementation complexity

Example: NICTA's seL4

- High-security version of L4 microkernel API
 - all authority granted by capabilities
 - full mediation, least privilege, separation of privilege, fail-safe defaults
 - only four system calls: read, write, create, derive
 - economy of mechanisms
 - semi-formal and formal models and design specs
 - open design (once published)
 - kernel memory explicitly managed by user-level resource manager
 - least privilege, separation of privilege
 - 7,000–10,000 lines of kernel code
 - least privilege
- Details later...