

RUNNING THE MANUAL

An Approach to High-Assurance Microkernel Development

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Or:


How to get Kernel Hackers to Work With Formal Methods

seL4 Project: Kevin Elphinstone, Philip Derrin, Dhammika Elkaduwe

L4.verified Project: Gerwin Klein, David Cock, Thomas Sewell,
Rafal Kolanski

BACKGROUND

- seL4 Project
 - Develop a new microkernel API
 - Address the known deficiencies of L4
 - Provide a specification for formal verification
- L4.verified Project
 - Formally model the seL4 API
 - Prove properties of that API
- Goal
 - Develop a verified, high-performance microkernel implementation




KERNEL DEVELOPMENT TECHNIQUES

Natural language specification:

- Easy to read and write
- Prone to ambiguity and incompleteness
- Fails to expose implementation issues

Low-level implementation (C, C++):


- Utility of the API can be evaluated
- Exposes implementation issues
- Performance is everything
 - Common code paths must be carefully hand-tuned
 - Significant penalty for poorly optimised code
- 5–10,000 lines of C and assembly code
- Tends to diverge from informal specifications



KERNEL DEVELOPMENT TECHNIQUES

Iterative prototype development:

- Specify and implement in parallel
- Debugging prototypes is a significant fraction of development time
 - Bugs are likely
 - Debugging support is limited
- Difficult to keep the design and the prototype consistent




KERNEL FORMALISATION TECHNIQUES

Abstract Models:

- Unambiguous, but may still be incomplete
- Risks omitting details that are critical for kernels
 - Ease (or possibility) of implementation on bare metal
 - Issues that may impact performance
 - Utility of API for building systems

Verification of low-level code:


- Difficult to prove that a real implementation conforms to the formal model
- L4.verified pilot project demonstrated that this is difficult



KERNEL FORMALISATION TECHNIQUES

High-level implementation (Haskell, Standard ML):


- Exposes performance and implementation issues
- Easier to reason about than C
- Language limitations and dependencies can cause problems
- May be difficult or impossible to attain high performance



OUR APPROACH

Specify and Implement in Haskell:

- Executable prototype attached to a simulator
 - Runs user-level client code
 - Easy to evaluate utility
 - Exposes *most* implementation issues
- Implementation is deferred until the API is stable
- Semi-formal specification
 - High level language
 - Pure functional semantics
 - Easy to formalise
- Feedback between kernel developers and formal methods team



EXPECTATIONS

- Advantages:
 - Less low-level debugging work than a real implementation
 - Pure functional semantics ease formalisation
 - Exposes API usability issues via simulation
 - Permits rapid evaluation of design alternatives

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- Advantages:
 - Less low-level debugging work than a real implementation
 - Pure functional semantics ease formalisation
 - Exposes API usability issues via simulation
 - Permits rapid evaluation of design alternatives
- Limitations:
 - Relies on experienced kernel developers to foresee performance issues

KERNEL MODEL

Overview:

- ① Event processing
- ② Kernel state
- ③ Error handling
- ④ Simulation

EVENT PROCESSING

Events:

- The kernel we are modelling is event-driven
- Hardware notifies the kernel of events
- Kernel responds by manipulating kernel and hardware state

```
kernel :: Event -> System -> System
```

EVENT PROCESSING

Events:

- The kernel we are modelling is event-driven
 - Hardware notifies the kernel of events
 - Kernel responds by manipulating kernel and hardware state
- ```
kernel :: Event -> System -> System
```
- Event types:
    - System calls
    - Virtual memory access faults
    - Interrupts
    - Exceptions

# EVENT PROCESSING

Kernel code is in a monad:

→ Encapsulates the states of the kernel and hardware models

```
type Kernel = State System
```

```
kernel :: Event -> Kernel ()
```

→ Allows kernel code to appear procedural

→ Gives us access to the Haskell monad template library

# KERNEL STATE

## Contents of the kernel state:

- Statically allocated global kernel data
  - Current thread
  - Scheduler queues
- Map of dynamically allocated kernel objects
  - Keys are physical addresses

# KERNEL STATE

## Dynamically allocated kernel objects:

- Several object types, depending on the kernel API:
  - Communication endpoints
  - Page tables
  - Capability table entries (CTEs)
  - Thread control blocks (TCBs)
  - Frames used to back virtual memory
- Functions of these objects are not relevant
- Properties of kernel object types
  - Physical size
  - Effects of system calls
  - Containers
    - These caused problems with the physical memory model

# PHYSICAL MEMORY MODEL

## Possible physical memory models:

- ① Untyped byte data
- ② Per-type structured storage
- ③ Unified structured storage
  - Encapsulation
  - Structure

# PHYSICAL MEMORY MODEL

## Array of bytes:

- Most realistic model
  - The kernel must eventually be refined to use this model
- Must convert between typed data and byte streams
- Forces data structures to be realistic
- Loses type information about stored objects
- Implementation in Haskell is painful

# PHYSICAL MEMORY MODEL

## Per-type Structured Storage:

- One array or map per kernel object type
- Easy to implement
- Need to demonstrate that we never use the same physical address for two different objects
  - Difficult to test using this model
  - Objects *do* overlap, when they are stored in containers (like CTEs in TCBs)

# PHYSICAL MEMORY MODEL


## Unified Structured Storage:

- Objects must be encapsulated so they are all the same type
- Universal type
  - Caused difficulties when adding architecture-specific object types
- Dynamic containers
  - Easier to use, harder to formalise
  - Currently using this method, but could now switch back
- Need to choose an appropriate structure

# PHYSICAL MEMORY MODEL

## Map or Array:


- Key or index is the physical base address
- One seL4 object type is sometimes contained in another
- Kernel accesses inner objects, unaware of the containers
- This doesn't work



# PHYSICAL MEMORY MODEL

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
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# PHYSICAL MEMORY MODEL

Binary tree indexed by physical address:


- Each address bit chooses a branch of the tree
- Number of bits used from the address depends on object size
- Remaining unused address bits are required to be 0



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
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
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
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# ERRORS AND FAULTS

## Aborting an Operation:

- User level programs may cause error conditions:
  - Providing invalid system call arguments
  - Invoking kernel objects that don't exist
  - Asking the kernel to traverse an invalid user-managed data structure
- Kernel must abort the current operation and handle the error
- To support this, we use the ErrorT monad transformer

```
type KernelF e = ErrorT e Kernel
```
- Separates kernel code according to what sort of errors, if any, it can encounter

# ERRORS AND FAULTS

## Classes of Error:

- System call errors
  - Can be handled by the caller
  - Kernel replies to the caller with an error code
- Faults
  - Cannot be handled by the current thread
  - Kernel sends a notification to a nominated user-level handler
- Missing capabilities or invalid capability tables
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- Missing capabilities or invalid capability tables
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  - May cause system call errors or faults, or a silent failure
- Fatal errors
  - Caused by kernel bugs or invalid states
  - Modelled by evaluating `undefined`
  - Verification must prove that these never occur

# USER-LEVEL SIMULATION

## Generating events:

- ① Hand-craft lists of events
  - ➔ Difficult to construct realistic event sequences
  - ➔ In a real system, events depend on kernel's actions
- ② Capture events from a running system
  - ➔ Only makes sense if source and tested systems are similar
  - ➔ Event sequence is independent of the kernel's actions
- ③ Generate events using a simulator

## USER-LEVEL SIMULATION

- Simple assembly language in Haskell
- Similar to a RISC CPU
- Difficult to write non-trivial programs

```
pingThread :: UserText
pingThread = [
 Move AR0 R0,
 LoadImmediate 0 R1,

 Move R0 AR0,
 Move R1 AR1,
 DebugPrintf "Ping %" [R1],
 Syscall SysSendIPC,
 ArithmeticI R1 (+1) R1,
 Move R0 AR0,
 Syscall SysReceiveIPC,
 Branch (-7)
]
```

## USER-LEVEL SIMULATION

- Haskell FFI and existing external simulators
  - M5 Alpha simulator
  - Locally-developed ARmv6 simulator
- Allows execution of compiled user-level programs
- Easier to write or port complex test programs

```
void ping_thread(seL4_Capability ep)
{
 int i=1;
 seL4_Word sender;
 seL4_MessageInfo tag;
 seL4_Wait(ep, &sender, &tag);

 while(1) {
 printf("Ping %x <-> ",i);
 tag.length = 0;
 tag.label = i++;
 seL4_SendWait(ep, ep,
 &sender, &tag);
 }


 return 0;
}
```

# USER-LEVEL SIMULATION

## Abstract hardware model:

- Interface is simplified and platform-independent:
  - Register set, including registers used for specific purposes
  - Hardware-defined data types
  - Virtual memory management
  - User level simulator
- Instances for specific hardware platforms


# SIMULATOR INTERFACE



# FORMALISATION

## Translation to Isabelle/HOL:

- Translation was initially manual
- Now mostly automatic
- We take a pragmatic approach to translation
  - Simple python script
  - Entirely text processing; no real analysis of the Haskell
  - To simplify formalisation, we are limited to a subset of Haskell
- The translated Isabelle/HOL is the real formal specification, and will be refined into the final implementation



# HASKELL VS. HOL

## Termination:

- Haskell functions do not necessarily terminate
- HOL requires that we prove that all functions terminate
- We could use HOLCF to avoid this, but termination is a useful property

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- We could use HOLCF to avoid this, but termination is a useful property
- We have proved termination for every kernel function
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## Monads:

- State and ErrorT have multiple type parameters
- It's inconvenient to formalise them completely in HOL
- We only formalise the instances that we need

# EXPERIENCE

## Evolution of the API design:

- Explored three major changes relative to L4:
  - Access control mechanisms for IPC
  - Kernel resource management
  - Kernel invocation mechanisms

# EXPERIENCE


## Evolution of the API design:

- Explored three major changes relative to L4:
  - Access control mechanisms for IPC
  - Kernel resource management
  - Kernel invocation mechanisms
- No need to implement a complete kernel before experimenting
  - First IPC test ran without a virtual memory model
  - First kernel resource management tests used single-level tables
  - Still working on ARM hardware-defined page tables

# EXPERIENCE

## Parallel Development:

- Translation to Isabelle/HOL started relatively early




Verification team identifying conceptual and verification issues.

Kernel team identifying conceptual and potential performance issues.

# EXPERIENCE

## Parallel Development:

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- Formalisation process has detected API problems
  - Unbounded IPC send operation




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# EXPERIENCE

## Parallel Development:

- Translation to Isabelle/HOL started relatively early
- Formalisation process has detected API problems
  - Unbounded IPC send operation
- Simulation has also revealed API problems
  - Missing operation: Identify
  - Implemented, tested, formalised within a few hours



Verification team identifying conceptual and verification issues.

Kernel team identifying conceptual and potential performance issues.

# DEMO

# QUESTIONS

Questions?